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THE PREMIERS OF QUEENSLAND 
The 1978 Clem Lack Oration 
of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland 
by DR. DENIS MURPHY 
Senior Lecturer in History, University of Queensland 
Read at Newstead Resource Centre, Newstead House, Brisbane, 
on Thursday 22 fune 1978 at 8.00 p.m. 
The late Clem Lack was a notable officer of the Royal Histori-
cal Society of Queensland. His career as a journalist covering 
almost 30 years of Queensland history was also notable. 
Tonight in the 1978 Clem Lack Oration, I shall be talking 
about the Premiers of Queensland. Clem Lack began his career as 
a journalist on the Gympie Times in 1918 when the great T. J. 
Ryan was at the height of his political career in Queensland. 
Clem Lack then moved to Brisbane in 1920 when another of the 
major Queensland political figures, E. G. Theodore was fighting 
his first election as Premier. It was to be Clem Lack's fortune to 
report for The Courier-Mail and then the Telegraph on the follow-
ing Premiers: William Gillies, William McCormack, Arthur 
Moore and William Forgan Smith. After a four-year break in 
Melbourne he returned to Brisbane to work directly for three 
Premiers: E. M. Hanlon, Vincent Gair and Frank Nicklin in the 
State Public Relations Bureau. 
My lecture tonight is about 31 Premiers.' Had 1 chosen to deal 
with each one separately that would have meant about a minute 
and a half to two minutes per Premier. That would hardly be 
justice for even the least competent. I have therefore chosen to 
deal with them in broad categories; to trace the development of 
the title "Premier"; to analyse the constitutional relationship 
between the Governor and the Premier; to note that these, the 31 
leaders of the State, have not been above political scandal; and 
finally to provide some assessment of those who are likely to be 
remembered in Queensland or Australian history. 
We are accustomed to recognising the leader of the majority 
party in the Legislative Assembly as the "Premier". If there is a 
coalition of parties in the majority in that House, then the leader 
of the senior partner is recognised as being the "Premier" of the 
State. There is now a formal department entitled the "Premier's 
Department". This was not always the case. However, the use of 
the title "Premier" to signify the flrst minister of the colony or 
State has a long popular history. 
In the 19th and very early 20th century the term Prime Minis-
ter was, at times, used rather than Premier. "Prime Minister" 
was a title often used in English newspapers when recording 
visits "home" of colonial and early State Premiers. Among his 
other legends, T. J. Byrnes, the favourite "native son" Premier, 
was designated as "Prime Minister of Queensland" on his 
impressive monument in the Toowong Cemetery. 
The formal recognition of the title "Premier" really dates from 
the Officials in Parliament Acts Amendment Act of 1963, which 
changed the designation of the Leader of the Government from 
Premier and Chief Secretary to that of simply Premier. Prior to 
that the term "Premier" had a varied history through the pages 
of Hansard. In the first pages of each volume of Hansard are listed 
the members of the Executive or Cabinet together with their 
portfolios. 
The term "Premier" was first used in his listing by Arthur 
Macalister in 1867. His successors Robert MacKenzie and 
Charles Lilley had this title attached to their other portfolios. 
However, when Macalister assumed the Premier's office for 
third time in 1874, for some unexplained reason he is not shown 
in the front of the Hansards as being "Premier". It was Thomas 
McIIwraith who again took the title "Premier" in Hansard in 
1879, and this pattern was followed through to the end of Robert 
Philp's first premiership in 1903. Premiers from Arthur Morgan 
through to T. J. Ryan did not use the title in their Hansard 
description until Ryan adopted this again in 1919. Successive 
Premiers have been called "Premier". 
For the first 26 years of responsible government the leader of 
the Government in Queensland was generally designated "Col-
onial Secretary" and was in charge of that department which 
acted as a clearing house for communications with the Colonial 
Governor. There were, however, some exceptions to this rule. 
When Arthur Macalister succeeded Robert Herbert as Leader of 
the Government in February 1866, he retained his earlier 
portfolio of Lands and Works and induced his erstwhile oppo-
nent Robert MacKenzie, to take on the offlce of Colonial Secre-
tary. 
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This, Macalister's first Government lasted only five months 
and resigned over a disagreement with the Governor, Sir George 
Bowen, concerning the issue of unsecured government notes. 
Herbert returned for less than three weeks, but assumed the of-
fice of Vice-President of the Executive Council, not Colonial Sec-
retary. He was the first Government Leader to use this title. On 
Macalister's forming his second ministry in August 1866, he 
took the portfolio of Colonial Secretary. There were three other 
exceptions to the rule of the Premier also being the Colonial Sec-
retary. These were: MacKenzie, the squatter's leader, who in his 
brief premiership of 15 months, retained the office of Colonial 
Treasurer; George Thorn, who was unexpectedly thrust into the 
premiership to keep out the young, ambitious and talented 
Samuel Griffith and to confirm Macalister as Agent-General in 
London, and who retained his earlier portfolios of Public Works, 
Mines and the Post Office. He also assumed the office of Vice-
President of the Executive Council. This last office, which did not 
dravv' a salary under the Officials in Parliament Act had 
remained unfilled for the previous ten years. The third example, 
John Douglas, Thorn's successor as Premier, also used the office 
of Vice-President of the Executive Council, but in November 
1877 he took on the portfolio of Colonial Secretary after trying 
two other ministers in that office. 
It was Samuel Griffith who began to delineate more clearly the 
special office of Premier. His 1884 Officials in Parliament Act not 
only specified the number of ministers — seven, of whom at least 
one had to sit in the Legislative Council, but also named the 
portfolios. In 1886 he reallocated the title of Colonial Secretary to 
another minister and had himself designated as Chief Secretary. 
By an 1896 amendment to the Officials in Parliament Act the of-
fice of Colonial Secretary was re-named Home Secretary and 
now dealt with internal matters, not those related to the Chief 
Minister of the Colony. All successive Premiers, to Frank 
Nicklin, retained the title of Chief Secretary. The only exception 
was Robert Philp who had to placate James Dickson after his loss 
of office to Anderson Dawson in 1899, and allowed him to retain 
the Chief Secretary's portfolio. 
THE GOVERNORS' POWERS 
At Separation, Queensland had a population of 30,000. By 
1890, this had grown to 330,000 with (Queensland having the 
highest population growth rate of any colony in those 30 years. 
However, the first 20 of these years represented a period of some 
political instability. There were 11 separate ministries headed by 
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eight different Premiers in these two decades. By contrast the 
1880's were years of political stability marked by the dominance 
of Thomas McIIwraith and Samuel Grifflth, the two most notable 
Premiers of the 19th century. Part of the contrast between the 
politics of the flrst two decades after Separation and those of the 
1880's reflected the absence of political parties and the impor-
tance of regionalised and personalised factions. 
Without political parties as we know them, the responsibility 
for calling on a politician to form a stable ministry was left to the 
Colonial Governor. In this area the power of the Governors was 
considerable in the 1860-1880 period and it was again to be of 
significance in the tirst decade of the 20th century when the par-
ties were finally sorting themselves out into their Labor versus 
non- or anti-Labor basis. 
The place and role of the Governor in the 20 years after Sep-
aration was possibly as significant as that of the Premier. While, 
in the first 50 years of responsible government five men, at least 
became Premier on the choice of the Governor rather than 
because they led the majority party or the Opposition in the As-
sembly. In July 1870, Arthur Palmer was chosen as Premier by 
the Governor, Colonel Samuel Blackall, who had then been in 
the colony for only two years. The background to this was that 
Charles Lilley's 18-month-old ministry had fallen; Macalister, 
the next major political figure could not form a ministry; and 
Palmer, who was about to retire from politics and was not recog-
nised as the Leader of the Opposition, was commissioned by 
Blackall to form a ministry. His ministry survived three general 
elections in four years, to fall in January 1874. It was again the 
Governor's choice that brought George Thorn and John Douglas 
to the office of Premier in June 1876 and March 1877 respec-
tively. Thorn was a member of the Legislative Council when 
appointed Premier, and Douglas the second lowest ranking min-
ister in Thorn's Government. The choice of Thorn and then 
Douglas by the Governor, William (later Sir William) Cairns, 
was assisted by the plotting of members of the "Liberal" factions 
who wished to keep young Sam Griffith out of the premiership. 
Grifflth had only just turned 29. 
Queensland had the distinction of producing "the flrst Labor 
Government in the world" and thus the flrst Labor Premier, 
Anderson Dawson. His elevation to the premiership indirectly 
resulted from a decision of the Governor, Lord Lamington, to 
appoint James Dickson, and not Robert Philp, as Premier after 
the death of T. J. Byrnes in September 1898. Dickson lacked 
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Philp's seniority in the "Continuous Ministry" though he had 
been Colonial Treasurer in the Thorn, Douglas and first Griffith 
ministries. He had been listed second to Byrnes in the Byrnes 
ministry. However, Dickson did not have total support in his 
own caucus and thus could barely command majority support in 
the Assembly. When he resigned on 1 December 1899, the 
Lieutenant-Governor, then Sir Samuel Griffith, commissioned 
Dawson to form a government. The few days of the Labor 
Government allowed Dickson's party to sort out its leadership 
problems and Philp, as leader of the majority party in the lower 
house, became Premier — a decision that should have been made 
14 months before. 
ANDY DAWSON (Dec. 1-7, 1899) 
The final example of the Governor having a major say in the 
person to be Premier came in September 1903. Although he had 
won the 1902 election by eight seats, the Premier, Robert Philp, 
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was soon in trouble with his own party and resigned his com-
mission in September 1903. The Governor, Sir Herbert 
Chermside, sent for Billy Browne, the Labor Opposition Leader 
who, mindful of the appointment and fall of the Dawson 
Government four years before, declined to form a government. 
The Governor should then normally have called a new election 
or sought out Arthur Rufledge, the second minister in Philp's 
cabinet Instead, acting on Browne's advice, he commissioned 
Arthur Morgan, to form a government. Morgan was then the 
Speaker in the Legislative Assembly; he led no party and had 
never been a minister. 
It might be emphasised that Chermside's choice of Morgan 
was not entirely his own. The downfall of Philp and the con-
struction of the flrst of two Liberal-Labor coalition governments 
were the work of William Kidston, another of those Scots who 
have played such a prominent role in Queensland political 
history. Kidston was to succeed Morgan when the latter retired 
from active politics to the Presidency of the Legislative Council. 
THE UPPER HOUSE FACTOR 
It may be convenient here to interrupt the Premier-Governor 
relationship to mention briefly the position of the Premier and 
the Legislative Council. 
Since Queensland abolished its Legislative Council in 1922 
there has been only the one house of parliament from which the 
Premier could be chosen. However, this pattern was no different 
in real terms in the 19th century. The one exception was George 
Thorn, the first "native born" Premier who was commissioned 
on 5 June 1876 when he was still a member of the Legislative 
Council. He resigned from the Upper House on 13 June and won 
the seat of Ipswich in the Assembly on 23 June. His period as 
Premier was, as 1 have already noted, very brief, and lasted only 
until 8 March 1877. 
Three other Premiers, John Douglas, Boyd Morehead and T. J. 
Byrnes were also members of the Legislative Council before 
becoming Premier, but all had moved to the Assembly before 
being called on to form a Government. Four other former Pre-
miers, Hugh Nelson, Morgan, Palmer and Morehead, were to 
serve out their political careers in the somnambulence of the 
Council. The Queensland Upper House consisted of members 
nominated for life, carrying the title of "Honourable" but receiv-
ing no salary, except that paid to the President. Both Nelson and 
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Morgan became Presidents of the Council and Nelson, Morgan 
and Palmer served as Lieutenant-Governors for brief periods. 
One other retired Premier, Frank Cooper, also served as Lieu-
tenant-Governor after World War II. 
Relations between the Premier and the Legislative Council 
were not always harmonious. Even a conservative Premier like 
Digby Denham, the last Liberal Party leader to win an election 
and hold the premiership in that right clashed violently at the 
end of 1911 with the Council over a Liquor Bill. The major con-
frontations came with Premiers like Samuel Griffith, William 
Kidston, T. J. Ryan and E. G. Theodore. This is not the place to 
discuss those issues in detail, but for Grifflth, Ryan and 
Theodore, the right of the Lower House to final authority over 
money bills was the crucial question — as it had been in the Brit-
ish Parliament. Theodore provided the final service to Parlia-
mentary government in Queensland by abolishing the Council 
in 1922.-
Let me now return to the power of the Governor as it related to 
the Premier, since this involves the other Premier, William 
Kidston, who carried out the greatest reform of the Legislative 
Council prior to Theodore. 
Reading the minuted correspondence of the British Colonial 
Office, one is impressed by the experience, advice, and, one must 
add, the liberalism of the men who made up that office. By the 
second half of the 19th century the Colonial Offlce had also built 
up a great deal of wisdom in dealing with colonial problems. 
Colonial Governors were advised not to become embroiled in 
local politics and, so far as was consonant with the wider claims 
of the Empire, to allow local problems and disputes to be settled 
locally and poHtically. 
THE CHELMSFORD ENCOUNTER 
Only one Queensland Governor seems to have really dis-
regarded this advice, and brought down on himself a rebuke 
from the Colonial Office. This was Lord Chelmsford, who 
refused the advice of his recently re-elected Premier, Kidston, in 
November 1907, to appoint sufficient new Legislative Coun-
cillors to allow the passage of a Wages Boards Bill. Queensland 
was then the only State not to have either Wages Boards or a 
Conciliation and Arbitration Court. Kidston had an electoral 
mandate and clear majority support in the Assembly for the 
Wages Boards Bill. On Kidston's resignation on the refusal of 
Chelmsford to accept his ministerial advice, Chelmsford not only 
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commissioned the Opposition leader, Robert Philp as Premier, 
but also granted him a dissolution with all the advantages of 
fighting an election as a Premier, and later Chelmsford used 
those undeflned reserve powers to grant supply even though this 
had not been passed by the Houses of Parliament. 
Thanks to the electric telegraph system, the Colonial Office 
was able to consider the problem of this Governor-Premier con-
flict as it emerged, bu t as in the case of the later problem that 
emerged in New South Wales between Sir Philip Game and Jack 
Lang, the Colonial Office advice was too late to prevent a con-
stitutional blunder being made. In the Colonial Office, in 
November 1907, A.B. Keith, one of the constitutional authorities 
on such matters, minuted the file: 
This is purely a local quarrel. . . The rule could therefore be 
that he (Chelmsford) should have accepted the ministerial 
advice of the late Premier Mr. Kidston . . . On the whole I 
consider Lord Chelmsford had better be advised to do so 
now, while being told that the matter is one for his discre-
tion.' 
In Melbourne, Alfred Deakin, then the most experienced and 
perceptive politician in Australia, wrote in his London Morning 
Post article: 
Why he (Chelmsford) should have chosen to sally forth at 
this juncture is not understood, but any Governor who 
deserts the safe path of constitutional procedure knows the 
risk he runs. In this case, the sum total of his exploit is the 
creation of a precedent which all his fellow Governors have 
promptly recorded as one not to be followed under any 
temptation.'^ 
Kidston won the election that Chelmsford had forced on him, 
though I would warn against using such an election result as any 
indication of the correctness or otherwise of the Governor's 
decision. After the election, Kidston and his Attorney-General, 
James Blair, brought down two Bills that in a cumbersome way 
provided some reform of the Council. 
The Queensland conflict of 1907-1908 over the respective 
powers of the Premier and the Governor became one of the cases 
studied by Dr. H. V. Evatt when, as a judge of the Australian 
High Court he wrote The K ing and His Dominion Governors which 
remains a standard text on this problem. Despite the case made 
by Evatt for a clarification of these dangerously unclear reserve 
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LORD CHELMSFORD 
powers of State Governors and Commonwealth Governors-
General, the problem posed by the Chelmsford-Kidston crisis 
and two subsequent Australian variations of that crisis remains 
unresolved. 
Beyond Chelmsford, Sir Will iam MacGregor actively 
encouraged the Premier, Digby Denham, to hold an election six 
months early in 1912 to take advantage of a law and order cam-
paign after the general strike. Sir Hamilton Goold Adams agreed 
to T. J. Ryan's advice to appoint additional Labor members to the 
Council, but would not give the Premier a majority there.^ 
Though recent Governors have sought to be advised fully by 
their Premiers on legislative and administrative actions, most 
historians would agree that the Governors since Sir Matthew 
Nathan, who signed the Legislative Council out of existence, 
have recognised that final power resides with the Premier and 
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his Cabinet. The existence of organised political parties since 
about 1910 has not only further reduced the power and in-
fluence of the Governor, but also has greatly increased the per-
sonal power of the Premier. 
Not so long ago, a couple of political scientists and at least one 
author tried to develop what was almost an "identikit" of an 
Australian Prime Minister. I don't flnd this a very useful or valid 
exercise, though I would concede that there is some overall value 
in looking at the age, occupation, religion and background of the 
31 men who have held the highest political office of the State.'' 
Let me consider ages first. 
The youngest Premier was also the first Robert Herbert 
Bowen's private secretary who was only 28 when he accepted the 
position. For Herbert the premiership of Queensland was 
merely one more step in his career with the British Colonial Of-
fice where he became permanent under-secretary in 1871. Next 
to Herbert in age came Edward Granville Theodore, who was 
only 34 when he succeeded T. J. Ryan as Premier in 1919. 
Theodore had already been Treasurer and Minister for Public 
Works for four years and must be numbered among the three 
most capable Premiers of the State. 
Five other men. Thorn, Griffith, Byrnes, Dawson and Ryan 
were also in their thirties when they became Premier. Grifflth 
and Ryan can be linked with Theodore when evaluating the 
most competent of the Premiers. The oldest man to become Pre-
mier was Frank Cooper, who was 70 when he succeeded William 
Forgan Smith in 1942. Next to him in age was James Dickson 
who was 65 when he became Premier in 1898. Dickson was 
Queensland's representative in the flrst Federal Cabinet but died 
in 1901 and has a suburb in Canberra named after him. Only one 
other Premier, Frank Nicklin, was to be over 60 when he became 
Premier. I don't know whether our politicians are growing older, 
but each of the last seven Premiers was over 50 when he assumed 
office. One has to go back to Forgan Smith in 1932 to find a Pre-
mier starting out in his mid-forties. 
In religion, Queensland Premiers have been, as one would 
expect predominantly Protestant with only six being Catholics. 
Of the 25 Protestant Premiers, 12 were Anglican, eight Presbyte-
rian, three Methodists or Wesleyans, as Lilley described himself, 
one Congregational and one Lutheran. Grifflth could pose here 
as something of a statisflcal problem. The son of a Con-
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gregational minister, as he moved upwards in politics he 
changed from being a Dissenter to being an Anglican, the 
religion of the Government House circle. 
STRONG SCOTTISH ELEMENT 
The large proportion of Presbyterians reflects the predomi-
nance of Scottish births among Queensland Premiers. Seven Pre-
miers were born in Scotland, five in England, one in Ireland, one 
in Wales, two in New Zealand, both Country Party Premiers, six 
in other Australian States, and only nine out of the 31 in Queens-
land. Understandably, although George Thorn was the first 
"native born" Queensland Premier, no legends grew up about 
him. He was not one of our great political figures. 
However, legends did emerge about the second "native born" 
Premier, Thomas Joseph Byrnes. Dying in office at the age of 37 
after only five months as Premier, Byrnes came to be eulogised as 
the epitome of the equality of opportunity that pervaded the 
Queensland colony. Born of poor Irish Catholic parents, he was 
number eight in a family of 11. Through winning a succession of 
scholarships he was able to complete a secondary education at 
the Brisbane Grammar School, and then Arts and Law degrees at 
Melbourne University. At the age of 29 his patron, the Premier 
and Attorney-General, Samuel Griffith, had him appointed to 
the Legislative Council as Solicitor-General. In the three decades 
between 1880 and 1910, when Austialia was searching for an 
identity and looking for native-born heroes, Byrnes, at his death, 
resembled the arch-type colonial hero. He remains the only Pre-
mier with two statues erected in his memory and one of only 
three Premiers commemorated by medals awarded annually for 
scholastic achievement. The other two so commemorated with 
scholastic medals were Charles Lilley and T. J. Ryan. Ryan also 
has a statue. 
Few of the Premiers in the first 50 years seem to have been 
much concerned with the organisation of Government. In any 
case the opportunity to experiment with such re-organisation 
was, to a large extent circumscribed by the 1884 and 1896 Offl-
cials in Parliament Acts. These not only limited the number of 
ministries, but also specified the portfolios that could be estab-
lished. Ryan was the first Premier to "get around" this obstacle 
in 1915 by appointing two honorary or assistant ministers. One, 
John Fihelly who assisted Ryan in the Attorney-General's 
Department was to be known as the Assistant Minister for 
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Justice. He was also the beginning of that practice in Queensland 
politics of not requiring the Attorney-General or Minister for 
Justice to have legal qualiflcations. 
It was Theodore who flrst used his experience in offlce and his 
position as Premier to provide a basis for change in government 
administration. He established a Royal Commission, under J. D. 
Story, into public administration and many of Story's recom-
mendations were incorporated into the machinery of Govern-
ment in the 1920's. Since Theodore, Premiers have been more 
prepared to experiment in this area. However, it would be 
difflcult to assess, at this stage of our knowledge, whether subse-
quent changes came from the initiatives of the Premiers them-
selves or from ministers, or senior public servants. 
To provide a full evaluation of the influence that home, back-
ground, schooling and so forth had on each Premier is a task 
beyond the scope and length of this paper. Each Premier would 
need to be studied against the philosophical, religious and eco-
nomic forces of his time and also for the effect these had on the 
class of people from whom he emerged. I think this has been 
reasonably well done for most but not all, of the Premiers 
featured in Queensland Political Portraits. 
There is a danger in historians, or other writers who venture 
into political biography, placing too much relevance or indeed 
misplacing the relevance of events and forces in childhood, when 
evaluating any figures in history. An example here might be 
McIIwraith and his Scottish Presbyterian background. 
McIIwraith could rebuke a colleague for reading a newspaper 
on the Sabbath, an indication, one might suggest of his strong 
religious belief; the same McIIwraith was anything but kind or 
Christian towards his wife, and displayed anything but religious 
honesty in his relations with the Queensland National Bank. On 
the other hand Frank Cooper's strong non-conformist religious 
background did have a lasting influence on his personal life and 
his life as a Labor politician and Premier. 
I must confess to a degree of personal scepticism about carry-
ing possible background influences too far in making them 
dominant factors in later behaviour patterns. Luther's constipa-
tion as a cause of the Reformation; Stalin's poor "potty" training 
as an explanation of his later thuggery, strike me as being as 
historically relevant as the link between Clydesdales' hooves 
being planted on a small boys's bare feet and his later ferocity as 
a Premier. 
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As one might expect the Premiers up to about that time when 
Labor began its long term of office, generally came from reason-
ably affluent backgrounds. There were some obvious exceptions 
to this, particularly with Dawson and Byrnes. Three Premiers — 
Herbert MacKenzie and Douglas were descendants of the 
aristocracy, and Douglas could claim some other family notor-
iety in having been a nephew of the Marquis of Queensberry. 
The remainder had fairly solid middle-class backgrounds. The 
change in the economic background of the Premiers came clearly 
with the Labor Premiers. Here, even in the case of Ryan, a bar-
rister with two University degrees, the backgrounds were dis-
tinctly not affluent. 
The first decade of the 20th century is the period which saw 
the final evolution of the system of political parties in Queens-
land. One finds here one of those historical coincidences that 
used to be placed in Senior Logic examinations. You remember 
the question: "Queen Victoria was a ruler; a ruler is 12 inches 
long, therefore Queen Victoria was 12 inches long. Explain". The 
first decade was also the decade which divides off the number of 
children of Queensland Premiers. Three Premiers, Herbert 
Byrnes and William McCormack were bachelors and therefore 
don't really concern us here. Up to Morgan who retired in 1906, 
there were eight Premiers who had six or more children, but 
none since his retirement has been so productive. Lilley with his 
13 children seemed the likely record holder, but he was eclipsed 
by Dickson who seems likely to retain the record in this regard. 
He had 15 children in his first marriage, but none in his second. 1 
leave the conclusions to be drawn from these amazing historical 
facts to other historians. 
In the 19th century the standard reward for service as a col-
onial Premier was the CMG or the KCMG, a practice which 
ceased with Kidston. A few Premiers such as Thorn and 
Morehead missed out altogether on any honours while Morgan, 
the last Premier to be knighted for 60 years, received a lower 
order of Knighthood. However, Premiers have not been loath 
about accepting honorary University doctorates. McIIwraith, 
Griffith, Nelson and Dickson all managed to obtain such 
honours from EngHsh or Scottish Universities in addition to 
their other awards. Kidston received an honorary doctorate from 
the new University of Queensland, for which he had legislated, 
and called himself "Dr." Kidston. The University was not called 
on to bestow this award on any more Premiers until Forgan 
Smith, who probably provided more assistance to the University 
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than any other Premier. Forgan Smith had an honorary LLD 
awarded in 1935. Again there was a 20-year lull, but from 
Nicklin to the present Premier, three of the four holders of that 
office have all modestly accepted honorary University doctor-
^*^s FEW NATIONAL FIGURES 
Not many of the Premiers became national figures in the sense 
of having reputations that extended beyond Queensland. 
Dickson was included in the first Federal Cabinet before the first 
election, but only because Queensland was to have one represen-
tative there and the Premier, Philp, did not want to leave 
Queensland politics. Dawson, having been elected to the Senate 
in 1901, became Minister for Defence in J. C. Watson's brief 
Labor Government of 1904. Mr. Gair too found a place in the 
Commonwealth Senate after losing first his Premier s office and 
then his seat in Parliament. As leader of the Democratic Labor 
Party in the Senate he gained something of a national reputation. 
Griffith, Ryan and Theodore were the three Premiers whose 
broader Australian national views outstripped State parochial-
ism to take them into national affairs. Griffith's main contribu-
tion was in the 1891 draft of the Federal Constitution. As Chief 
Justice of Queensland from 1893, after Lilley's stepping down to 
re-enter politics, Griffith was not able to take an active or official 
part in the later Constitutional Convention debates. He did, 
however, become the first Chief Justice of the High Court. Ryan 
and Theodore were drawn into Federal politics by their successes 
as State Premiers and through the inter-State reputation thay 
had made as Premiers. In the 1930s there were attempts to have 
Forgan Smith enter the House of Representatives, but he resisted 
these. Mr. Bjelke Petersen seems to have acquired something of a 
SIR THOMAS MclLWRAITH (1879-83, June-Nov. 1888 and Mar.-Oct. 1893) 
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national reputation also, but somehow it doesn't seem to be quite 
the inter-State reputation that Grifflth, Ryan and Theodore 
enjoyed. 
About all that one can say about this type of statistical break-
down of the Queensland Premiers is that so far as our 
knowledge goes, they seem to have been very much like their col-
leagues in other colonies and States. Queensland has had its 
share of very good and very poor Premiers. The majority, 
however, probably fit into the fair average quality variety, but we 
have certainly experienced the two ends of the spectrum. 
TOUCHES OF SCANDAL 
Queensland Premiers have not all remained above scandal 
related to their mis-use of ministerial office. Generally, however, 
they have managed to be cleared by subsequent inquiries. Only 
Theodore and McCormack were publicly found guilty by a Royal 
Commission whose findings were subsequently reversed by a 
Supreme Court trial. There is no doubt that they were guilty of 
mis-use of their ministerial office, though I would disagree with 
Dr. Kett Kennedy in his book. The Mungana Affair,' that they 
were in any sense proved guilty of fraud. There have been other 
scandals which are worth noting. 
The steel rails case of 1880-81 involving McIIwraith, Palmer 
and to a lesser extent, Macalister, then Agent General in London, 
in a Parliamentary Select Committee and then a Royal Commis-
sion. These investigated the proprietary of Mcllwraith's brother 
Andrew and the family shipping company of Mcllv/raith, 
McEachern being given preferential treatment to ship 15,000 
tons of steel rails to Queensland. The price paid for the rails by 
the Queensland Government was also a factor involved. The 
Select Committee divided on its findings while the Royal Com-
mission exonerated the three Premiers, but made a hero of the 
chief prosecutor and fut-ure Premier Griffith. 
In 1882 Morehead, then a stock and station agent appointed by 
McIIwraith to the Legislative Council, was involved in an 
investigation by a Parliamentary Select Committee into his 
accepting a IVi percent commission on the sale of Crown land 
which had been halved in price by the McIIwraith Government 
for the benefit of Southern capitalists. Again, the chief prosecu-
tor Griffith and again he was unsuccessful in pressing his charge 
home. Morehead refused to answer Griffith's charges, claiming: 
"It would not be consistent with my honour, nor with my dig-
nity, to rebut charges against me and my firm", surely the perfect 
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politician's answer which was to re-appear with slight variations 
down to the present time. Grifflth had his political revenge for 
the steel rails and the Morehead cases when he defeated McII-
wraith at the 1883 election. 
The greatest known political scandal in Queensland's history 
and I emphasise known, was the collapse of the Queensland 
National Bank in 1896.^ This involved three former directors 
and Premiers, McIIwraith, Palmer and Morehead. McIIwraith 
became a director of the bank in 1874 when he was a minister in 
the Macalister government. It was then that the movement began 
to make the Queensland National Bank the official Queensland 
Government Bank. Morehead became a director of the bank in 
1876. On his assumption of office as Premier in 1879 McIIwraith 
resigned as a director and was conveniently replaced by Arthur 
Palmer, his brother-in-law. In that same year the agreement be-
tween the Queensland Government and the Union Bank expired 
and, not unexpectedly, the Queensland National Bank suc-
cessfully tendered for the sole conduct of Government banking 
business. McIIwraith, in collusion with Palmer, Morehead and 
Edward Drury the general manager, used the resources of this, 
the Government Bank, for land speculation and at the time of its 
collapse McIIwraith owed the bank more than £250,000, a 
further £77,000 owed by him had been written off and he had 
security of only £60,000 to cover these debts. 
Mcllwraith's political colleagues in 1897 did their best to cover 
for him, but in the end they had to make public a report on the 
collapse of the bank in order to preserve their own political posit-
ions. The chicanery associated with the involvement of Cabinet 
ministers and Government backbenchers with the Queensland 
National Bank makes one sceptical of subsequent claims to the 
public honesty of ministers who were "laying on the table" their 
financial association when Government contacts with particular 
companies were involved. 
In the Mungana scandal two former Premiers, Theodore and 
McCormack, were accused of selling two worthless mines to the 
State and of knowing they were worthless. They had also held 
shares in Mt. Isa mines when the decision whether or not to 
build a railway to Mt. Isa was being made by Cabinet and they 
held shares in a sawmill and in mines doing business with the 
State. Without attempting to argue the case for or against them, I 
would argue, from my own research, that the appointment of the 
Royal Commissioner J. L. Campbell, the actual sale of the mine 
and a number of other factors need a fuller investigation before 
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we can make a definite verdict on the fraud charge. What is clear, 
despite the Supreme Court verdict is that Theodore and .VlcCor-
mack were guilty of abuse of their ministerial offlce, much as 
were McIIwraith, Palmer and Morehead in the Queensland 
National Bank scandal. 
In going through the archival material relating to the Queens-
land Premiers, students and historians are wont to come across 
tantalising letters and paragraphs in letters that suggest 
perhaps, that not all favours done for companies by some Pre-
miers and their colleagues were because the Premier and the 
directors "were just good friends". There is enough cumulative 
evidence, certainly, to indicate that the office of Premier has been 
abused and that there needs to be a law commanding all Parlia-
mentarians to make public their share holdings and to prevent 
them or their families being involved in any companies or busi-
nesses doing direct financial business with the State Govern-
ment. 
WHO WERE THE ABLEST? 
Inevitably when one comes to discuss any political leaders, the 
question emerges who were the most able, who left the greatest 
mark on the State? Answering this question involves making a 
judgment which 1 suppose is part of the role of the historian. 
To become Premier a man, and one would hope at least bv the 
end of the century, a woman, must join a political party and be 
elected to the Legislative ,A.ssembly. Success then in politics 
should depend on ability, but that certainly has not alwavs been 
the case. Place of residence, occupation at various times, religion, 
a certain luck in being there at the right time, the early or 
untimely death of an heir apparent economic disasters or suici-
dal quarrels among one's political friends or opponents are all 
factors which have led certain men to the premiership of the 
State. Consequently, we have had a few Premiers that might be 
termed "accidental" Premiers. 
There is no direct relationship between competence as a Pre-
mier and the length of time in office. Griffith was Premier twice, 
on the first occasion for four-and-a-half years — his most suc-
cessful period — and on the second occasion for three years, 
which were years of depression. Ryan was Premier only once for 
four-and-a-half years, while Theodore was Premier for flve-and-
a-half years. One might also usefully look at a Premier's work as 
a minister before succeeding to the premiership, to make an 
evaluation. In this case, when their role and competence as min-
104 
isters is added to-that of their periods as Premiers, the overall 
reputation of both Griffith and Theodore is enhanced. In Ryan's 
case, as he was one of the six Premiers who took offlce without 
prior ministerial experience, his competency as a Premier is even 
more enhanced. 
It is difflcult to be deflnite about the value of having held min-
isterial offlce before becoming Premier. Certainly as a general 
rule one would have to argue its advantages. Morgan in 1903 
was the first Premier of consequence, after Herbert who came to 
the office without any previous ministerial experience. Morgan 
was a successful conciliator as he sat on top of the first Liberal-
Labor coalition in Australia's history; he had had experience as 
Chairman of Committees and Speaker, but his greatest advan-
tage was in having a strong competent person like Kidston as 
Treasurer and, after Billy Browne's death, as Deputy Premier. 
Ryan, Arthur Moore and Frank Nicklin were the other three 
Premiers who took office without previous ministerial 
experience. This did not seem to effect Ryan's performance. The 
lack of ministerial experience was merely one of the problems 
faced by the hapless Moore, who was Premier during the depres-
sion; but the absence of such experience does seem to have been 
a factor with Frank Nicklin who took a considerable time to find 
his feet in his new office. 
One could list also those Premiers who, despite ministerial 
experience, proved unable to cope with the broader respon-
sibilities of premiership. In the case of Dickson, Philp, Denham 
and William Gillies each had considerable ministerial experience 
during which he had performed with competence. However, 
their periods as Premier did not reveal the same competence. 
With Thorn, Douglas and Morehead, on the other hand, their 
lack lustre performance as Premiers seem to have been due prin-
cipally to a lack of general political ability. 
If one omits the week-long premierships of Anderson Dawson 
and Gordon Chalk, on average Queensland's 31 Premiers have 
each held office for about four years. However, in the stability 
that has characterised Queensland politics in the past 50 years, 
three Premiers, Forgan Smith, Nicklin and Mr. Bjelke-Petersen 
will each have been Premier for ten years. Had he not permitted 
a split to occur in his own party in 1957, there is no question that 
Mr. Gair would have been Premier for even longer than 10 years. 
How does one explain this contrast? I believe there are three 
broad reasons. In this last 40-year period it has been the strength 
of the party system, the weakness of the opposition parties and, 
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since 1949, Queensland's descent into the deplorable Australian 
State government practice of subverting normal processes by rig-
ging and gerrymandering electoral boundaries, that have pro-
vided for this new phenomenon of 10-year Premiers. 
Let me return to the question of competency of Premiers. How 
does one begin to make an evaluation? 1 do not propose to 
deliver a check list of plus and minus points, as that seems 
beyond the scope of this lecture. However, I would suggest that a 
very good primary test of any Premier's political ability and com-
petence is a reading of his Hansard speeches while he is still a 
backbencher. Here one may judge his grasp of politics, his 
breadth of ideas and his ability to cope with a multitude of ques-
tions. 
A second good place to look is the Premier's local newspapers 
where his unrehearsed speeches and press statements appear in 
all of their heart-felt innocence. Again this is best done in those 
periods before he attained office. Once he becomes a minister or 
Premier, the test loses some of its validity and almost all when 
one comes down to the present time. Premiers now rarely deliver 
their own speeches; they read speeches written by departmental 
officers, or more usually by press officers. No longer do the gall-
eries in the Legislative Assembly fill in anticipation that at eight 
o'clock a T. J. Ryan or other orator will speak for an hour from a 
handful of notes which consist only of headings and a few key 
phrases or sentences that he wishes to emphasise. The art of 
oratory is fast becoming lost in Queensland Parliament and one 
doubts its competence to debate the great issues of the day. Writ-
ing biographies of Premiers is hard enough, but the problem 
now looming for the future historian is: whose speech is it that 
he is now reading, whose political comments is he reading in the 
newspapers, and who arranged the questions or the subjects for 
that television or radio interview? Consequently the Govern-
ment archival papers and private papers of contemporaries have 
become even more important for the future historians. A skilful 
press officer and the stiong party system can now provide for the 
survival, as Premier, of a man who would certainly have gone 
under quickly in the 19th century. 
For many of you, the way in which different Premiers 
organised their governments, their relations with the public ser-
vice, and their method of operation as leaders of governments 
would have been of greater significance than the more descrip-
tive analysis I have provided here. Some of that information is 
contained in Queensland Political Portraits and in the only full-
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length biography that we have of a Premier: that on T. J. Ryan. 1 
can only further say that the research required for that very 
necessary analysis will take some considerable time and involve 
political science and public administration students as well as 
those involved in political history. 
SUBJECTS FOR BIOGRAPHY 
Short pen pictures of the Premiers have been provide by 
Charles Bernays in his two chronicles Queensland Politics During 
Sixty Years 1859-1919, and Our Seventh Political Decade. They have 
also been provide by Clem Lack in his Three Decades of Queens-
land Political History. These were both highly personalised and, 
while they have a certain value, are not really adequate for a 
knowledge of the Premiers. The Australian Dictionary of Biography 
has so far covered all the Premiers who flourished before 1890 
and in the current set of volumes will complete the list until 
1939. 
Not every Queensland Premier has been worthy of a book to 
mark his eminence or competency as a political figure. 1 have 
already indicated my assessment of Griffith, Ryan and Theodore 
as being the most eminent and competent Premiers. There is a 
political biography of Ryan; at present Professor R. B. Joyce is 
completing his biography of Griffith. Theodore is the most com-
plex of the three and to date has only a very poor and very inac-
curate biography written about him, apart from the chapter in 
Queensland Political Portraits. After considerable searching, I hope 
a new start will be made on a biography of Theodore in 1979 by a 
very competent student. Of the remaining Premiers, McIIwraith 
and Forgan Smith are the only two whose eminence rates a 
biography on the scale of Ryan, Theodore and Griffith. Mcll-
wraith's financial career and his being the Queensland example 
of the great American capitalists of the 19th century make him 
worthwhile as the subject of a biography aside from his political 
life. Professor B. D. Waterson, of Macquarie University, is near-
ing completion of his biography of McIIwraith. 1 have hopes for a 
full-scale biography of Forgan Smith being started next year. 
Had the late Charles Bateson lived to complete his book on 
Burns, Philp then this, plus Professor Bolton's chapter in Queens-
lartd Political Portraits would have been an adequate coverage of 
Philp, who like Willian Kidston is probably in the grey area 
regarding a biography. Philp has had a sort of journalist's 
hagiography done on him; there is a small admiring booklet on 
Nelson; a poor, but short semi-autobiographical biography on 
Gair and a recent attempt at a biography of Mr. Bjelke-Petersen. 
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Shorter, contemporary biographies of Gair and Nicklin should 
be completed by two history students at the Queensland Univer-
sity in the next year or so. 
In Queensland Political Porfra/fs Professor R. B. Joyce and myself 
attempted to select the 14 most significant Premiers between 
1859 and 1952 to indicate the style and development of Queens-
land politics over almost 100 years. In retrospect we might also 
have included Sir Hugh Nelson, Premier from 1893 to 1898 and 
the last of the squatter Premiers. Nelson's career would have 
provided scope for an examination of the Queensland National 
Bank scandal. 
Making the judgment of who would have been included in 
that volume was relatively easy. The 12 Premiers of the 1859-
1952 period who were not in Queenslarid Political Portraits vir-
tually excluded themselves. Perhaps the major problem was 
about Arthur Moore, whose competency was not high, though 
he was certainly not as poor a Premier as his political opponents 
and his political allies of the 1930s labelled him. His attempt to 
turn back the Queensland clock and his muffing of his electoral 
redistribution.in 1931 were lessons not lost on Nicklin when he 
became the second Country Party Premier in 1957. Moore was, 
however, the first Country Party Premier and the only non-
Labor Premier in 42 years of Queensland history. 
Among the hundreds of personal letters written to Lily Ryan 
in 1921 on the death of T. J. Ryan, was a very significant one 
from Charles Bernays. He began by saying: "There is hardly any 
field where one may study human nature with such precise 
results as in the Parliamentary arena". The historian must go 
beyond that but nevertheless in asssessing the Premiers of the 
State one must with Bernays, come back to the Parliamentary 
arena. As we read more closely the debates in Parliament the 
archival papers in the Queensland State Archives, and other 
archival and private papers in the National, Mitchell, Oxley, 
Fryer and other libraries, it is inevitable that the reputations of 
some of the Premiers will change. 
I think McIIwraith will continue to stand out for the sheer 
breadth of his developmental ideas; Griffith will be remembered 
for his intellectual calibre, his role in education, in codifying the 
laws, in developing sugar and farming as "small men's" indus-
tries, and for his work in drafting the Federal Constitution. 
Kidston now seems to have been given his due place as a compe-
tent reforming Premier and, it must be emphasised, as the politi-
cian who legislated for adult franchise which meant votes for 
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women, in Queensland and for "one man, one vote, one value". 
That was 68 years ago. Ryan remains the most able of the Pre-
miers and, with Theodore and Forgan Smith, the Premiers who 
fulfilled in the sugar industry at least the 19th century dream of 
Australia being the nation of yeomen farmers. In his own right 
Theodore was the architect of labour laws and laws relating to 
primary producers which then placed Queensland in advance of 
any other Australian State. Finally, while Hanlon will be remem-
bered for his health and welfare legislation, we will try not to 
remember his leading Queensland away from Kidston's demo-
cratic "one man, one vote, one value" principle and into the 
damnable land of the gerrymanderers, a lead which two of his 
successors Nicklin and Bjelke-Petersen have so eagerly followed. 
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Despite the views of some journalists and pop sociologists 
there is no political species called "Queensland Premier" which 
grows only north of the Tweed River and has been instantly and 
immediately recognised for the past 100 years as exhibiting start-
ling differences from its southern counterparts. It is certainly 
true that Queensland has had some poor and some incompetent 
Premiers, but so have the other colonies and States. Equally, 
Queensland has had some very able Premiers and perhaps, 
nostalgically, we can look on these as the best examples of what 
the State has produced. 
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